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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that taxation of retained profits is particularly distortionary in an economy with
good growth prospects and poorly developed financial markets because it primarily reduces the
investment of financially constrained firms, investment that has marginal product greater than the
after-tax market real interest rate.  Contrarily, taxes on distributed profits or capital gains primarily
reduce the investment of financially unconstrained firms. Chile experienced a banking crisis over
the period from 1982 to 1986 and in 1984 reduced its tax rate on retained profits from 50 percent to
10 percent. We show that, consistent with our theory, there was a large increase in aggregate
investment after the reform which was entirely funded by an increase in retained profits. Further, we
show that investment grew by more in industries that depend more on external financing, according
to  the  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  measure.  Finally,  we  present  some  weak  evidence  from
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The performance of the Chilean economy since the mid 1980s has been extraordinary:
Chile’s GDP per capita grew at an average rate of 4.5 percent per year during the decade
following 1983 (Figure 1a). While not as impressive as the growth miracles of the Asian
developing economies during the postwar period, Chile’s strong economic performance is
unique among the developing economies in the Western hemisphere. As is well known,
an important part of Chile’s impressive growth is a saving and investment boom on the
order of ten percent of GDP (Figure 1b). In this paper, we present evidence that a main
cause of this investment and growth boom was a corporate tax reform that cut the tax
rate on retained proﬁts from nearly 50 percent to 10 percent over the period 1984 to 1986.
From economic theory, we argue that this reform could have large eﬀects. When ﬁrms
face credit constraints, taxation of retained proﬁts is more distortionary than taxation of
dividends or household capital gains. By deﬁnition, the return to the marginal investment
of a constrained ﬁrm is (weakly) greater than the after-tax real interest rate. Taxation
of retained proﬁts reduces precisely this potentially highly productive investment, since
it reduces internal funds and therefore reduces the investment of constrained ﬁrms by the
amount of the tax. Unconstrained ﬁrms can largely avoid retaining proﬁts and are able
to fund investment through other means. Thus, in an economy with poorly developed
ﬁnancial markets, but otherwise favorable macroeconomic policies and conditions, such
as Chile in the mid 19800s, taxing retained earnings is potentially quite harmful.1 The
1984 tax reform, by reducing the tax rate on retained earnings, increased the internal
funds of many credit constrained ﬁr m sa n ds om a yh a v eb e e nr e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h ei n c r e a s e
in aggregate investment.
We present three types of evidence to assess the importance of our theory.
First, we show that the timing of aggregate saving and investment boom and its
composition are both consistent with the reduction in the taxation of retained proﬁts
being a major cause of the investment boom. Investment increased by 4.5 percent of
GDP in the ﬁrst year of the reform and had increased by over 10 percent of GDP by
1These ‘favorable macroeconomic policies’ represent other important causes of growth that we discuss
subsequently.
1ﬁve years after the reform, reaching 25 percent of GDP. The tax reform occurred at
the beginning of the investment boom while other reforms such as trade liberalization
and the privatization of the public pension system signiﬁcantly predate the boom. More
importantly, the increase in investment was entirely funded by business saving, that is,
by retained proﬁts. Private saving and public saving remained largely unchanged.
Second, the cross-industry pattern of investment is also consistent with our theory.
Using an annual Chilean survey of plants that covers all Chilean manufacturing plants with
more than 10 employees, we show that investment rates rose after the reform primarily in
industries that are heavily dependent on external ﬁnance. Industries classiﬁed by Rajan
and Zingales (1998) as dependent on external ﬁnance had larger increases in investment
in 1985, 1986 and 1987, although not in the ﬁrst year of the reform, 1984.
Finally, despite not having clean measures of ﬁnancial constraints at the ﬁrm level,
we present the results of comparing the investment rates of plants that are plausibly
constrained to those that are plausibly unconstrained using the measures we do have.
T h a ti s ,w ed i v i d ep l a n t si n t ot h o s et h a ta r eo w n e db yﬁrms that are more and less likely
to face ﬁnancing constraints and compare the investment behavior of plants owned by
these diﬀerent types of ﬁrms through the tax reform. Here, the evidence on our theory
is weaker and more mixed. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the plants owned by ﬁrms that
exhibited a high correlation of cash ﬂow and investment before the reform increased their
investment signiﬁcantly more in the reform and to some extent following the reform as
compared to similar plants that had low prior correlations of cash ﬂow and investment.
We also ﬁnd some evidence that plants owned by ﬁrms that previously had low short-term
reserves increased their investment more during and to some extent following the reforms.
However, we ﬁnd no evidence that plants owned either by ﬁrms that pay rent or by ﬁrms
that are smaller beneﬁtted disproportionately from the reform, but we also note that the
small ﬁrm versus large ﬁrm distinction is less likely to measure the degree of ﬁnancial
constraints facing a ﬁrm in Chile, as compared to the United States.
This paper is primarily related to two literatures. First, our analysis adds to the
literature on the impact of tax policies on investment and the importance of ﬁnancial
2constraints for investment.2 Calomiris and Hubbard (1995) and Rajan and Zingales (1998)
are the closest papers to our current paper. Calomiris and Hubbard (1995) use a ﬁrm’s
reaction to the retained proﬁts tax of 1936 −37 in the United States to identify liquidity
constrained ﬁrms and then study their subsequent investment behavior. We reverse this
process. Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the growth pattern of industries with diﬀering
needs for external ﬁnancing in countries with diﬀerent levels of ﬁnancial development.
We compare the response of investment to Chile’s 1984 tax reform across industries with
diﬀering needs for external ﬁnancing.
Second, we add to the literature on the causes of economic development, and in partic-
ular, to the work that has focussed on the Chilean ‘miracle.’ While the 1984 tax reform is
frequently mentioned among Chilean observers as potentially important in explaining the
subsequent investment boom,3 previous research has focused on other reforms undertaken
by Chile, particularly the liberalization of the trade regime, the liberalization and deep-
ening of ﬁnancial markets, bankruptcy reform, and the privatization of public pension
system, rather than on the corporate tax reform as the underlying cause of Chile’s growth
performance.4 To be clear, our argument is not that these other reforms are irrelevant
for growth in general. It is likely that some of these reforms raised Chile’s steady-state
level of output per person, although we do not evaluate this claim. We provide evidence
that the reduction in the tax on retained proﬁts increased the accumulation of capital,
and our preferred interpretation of this ﬁnding is that the tax reform lead to rapid rather
than slow convergence towards steady-state. In applying this lesson to ﬁnancially under-
developed economies more broadly, it is important to note that taxing retained earnings
is highly distortionary only when there are productive investment opportunities.
2See Hubbard (1998), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and
Hasset and Hubbard (2002) for reviews. Cummins, Hassett and Hubbard (1996) discuss the diﬃculties
inherant in cross-country estimation of the impact of taxes on investment, and present evidence that
investment responds to tax incentives in general.
3See Agosin (1999), Agosin, Crespi, and Letelier (1997), Budnevich and Jara (1997), Bustos, Engel,
and Galetovic (1998), Larroulet (1987), and Marfan and Bosworth (1993) for brief discussions of the 1984
tax reform.
4See Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe and Soto (2002), Edwards (1996), Gallego and Loayza (2000), Morandé
(1996), and Pavcnik (2002).
3The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section models the eﬀect of taxes on
retained proﬁts when some ﬁrms are constrained from borrowing as much as they would
like to invest at market interest rates. Section 3 describes the 1984 tax reform in Chile.
Section 4 present aggregate evidence that the corporate tax reform was a signiﬁcant cause
of Chile’s rapid growth. Sections 5 details our use of the annual plant-level data from the
Chilean manufacturing census that we use in sections 6 and 7 to test the industry and
plant-level predictions of our theory respectively. Section 8 discusses alternative explana-
tions for Chile’s investment boom, and in doing so provides some broader description of
the Chilean experience for the reader. A ﬁnal section concludes and an Appendix contains
additional theoretical results and information about the data that we employ.
2 Investment and taxes on retained earnings
H o wd o e sat a xo nr e t a i n e dp r o ﬁts alter investment and productivity? In this section, we
consider the investment decision of a household that owns a proﬁtable ﬁrm and is unable
to borrow to ﬁnance investment. Firms and households face credit constraints and ﬁrms
with highly productive investment opportunities are constrained from borrowing to invest
at the optimal rate. We consider an economy like Chile’s in which there are three taxes
levied on capital income: proﬁts tax (τp), retained proﬁts tax (τr), and dividend income
tax (τd). The retained proﬁts and the dividend income tax rate are deﬁned as the tax
rate net of the proﬁts tax. We assume that the economy is small and open so that the
after-tax real interest rate is ﬁxed at rf.
Consider two ﬁrms that have the same initial capital stock (K0) and proﬁts (π), but
that diﬀer in the productivity of the investment opportunities available to them. Firm H,
has a highly productive investment opportunity, and ﬁrm L does not. Figure 2 shows the
marginal product of capital in the future for each ﬁrm, with MPKH lying above MPKL.
In a world with perfect capital markets, each ﬁrm would set the pre-tax marginal product
of capital equal to the required pre-tax rate of return to investment, which is equal to
the after-tax rate of return adjusted for the tax rates. Thus the ﬁrst-best levels of capital
chosen would be KH∗ and KL∗ and gross investment would equal KH∗+KL∗−2(1− δ)K0
4where δ is the depreciation rate of old capital.
However, if we assume that these ﬁrms, and their owners, do not have access to
external funds — debt or equity — to ﬁnance further investment, then their new investment
is limited by their after-tax retained proﬁts or (1 − τp)(1− τr)π.B o t h t h e p r o ﬁts tax
and the tax on retained proﬁts decrease funds available for investment. This bound on
investment limits the future capital stock to
¯ K =( 1− δ)K0 +( 1− τp)(1− τr)π.
Thus, as shown, ﬁrm H with a highly productive investment opportunity is unable to
take full advantage of this opportunity ( ¯ K<K H∗).
Consider now a cut in the rate of tax on retained proﬁts to τ0
r. The new maximum
l e v e lo ft h ec a p i t a ls t o c ki s
¯ K
0 = K0 +( 1− τp)(1− τ
0
r)π> ¯ K.
This tax cut has two important features. First, it impacts ﬁrms diﬀerently. For the
constrained ﬁrm (H), every peso decrease in tax revenue leads to a peso increase in
its capital stock: ∆K =( 1 − τp)π∆τr = ∆revenue. For the unconstrained ﬁrm, the
decrease in tax paid does not lead to a corresponding increase in its capital stock.
Second, new investment caused by this policy occurs for projects with productivity
that exceeds the marginal product of a peso of outside capital or external funds. It is
precisely those ﬁrms with the most productive investment opportunities which have the
greatest need for funds for capital and so beneﬁt the most from an increase in available
internal funds. The policy change thus leads to an increase in productivity. The increase in
output from the increase in capital is ∆Y =
MPKH( ¯ K)+MPKH( ¯ K0)
2 ∆K> = rf
(1−τp)(1−τd)∆K.
Comparatively, a cut in the dividend tax rate increases the incentive to invest by all
ﬁrms. But highly proﬁtable ﬁrms that are not paying dividends and are cash constrained
are unable to raise their investment rates in response to such a tax cut. The marginal
product of new investment generated from such a tax cut has the social marginal value of
capital since it changes the investment rates of ﬁrms that are setting their capital stocks
so as to equalize marginal products and interest rates. Alternatively, a cut in the proﬁts
5tax rate increases the incentive to invest by all ﬁrms, and allows further investment by
cash constrained ﬁrms, but does not target the tax cut at highly productive investment
opportunities. Similarly, a cut in the household tax on capital gains reduces the frictionless
demand for capital but, at the margin, does not reduce the capital demand of constrained
ﬁrms.
This graphical exposition is stylized in three ways worth noting. First, it is unlikely
that any ﬁrms are truly constrained. Most if not all ﬁrms probably have access to funds at
some price. But for many ﬁrms the costs of monitoring and enforcement may be extremely
high, so that these ﬁrms face interest rates far above oﬃcial rates. Such transaction costs
associated with making loans act in a similar way to credit constraints.5 Second, we have
not been explicit about product markets. It is necessary that the size of unconstrained
ﬁrms be limited by economies of scope (so there is diminishing returns in F(.))o rb yd e -
mand, such as through monopolistic competition. Thus the proﬁt opportunities available
to one ﬁrm are not available to all ﬁrms. If they were, the distribution of internal funds
and credit constraints would be irrelevant for aggregate investment. Finally, in a multi-
period world, a tax on retained proﬁts reduces optimal investment for an unconstrained
ﬁrm. Only for a ﬁrm without new investment (in excess of depreciation allowances) is
there no tax beneﬁt or government revenue lost and no change in incentives or value.
H o w e v e r ,t h ei m p a c tr e m a i n ss i g n i ﬁcantly less than on the investment behavior of a con-
strained ﬁrm because the retained proﬁts tax aﬀects the marginal return to investment
from the optimal level rather than a tightening of a binding constraint.6
In appendix A, we present a two-period model that formalizes the above arguments,
a n df r o mt h i ss i m p l em o d e lw eg a u g et h em a g n i t u d eo ft h ei n c r e a s ei nc a p i t a ls t o c kt h a t
we expect to result from a cut in the tax in retained proﬁts. The aggregate importance
of a tax on retained proﬁts depends on whether a signiﬁcant number of ﬁrms are credit
5As we argue later, in 1984, the Chilean banking sector was still suﬀering the after eﬀects of the debt
crisis. A number of banks had gone bankrupt and a number had been taken over by the government.
Thus, at this time, the sector that monitors loans and enforces debt legal debt contracts was small and
probably had low technology leading to high costs of external ﬁnance.
6Although we do not study ﬁrm creation, the retained proﬁts tax signiﬁcantly changes the value of a
new ﬁrm, and ﬁrm creation does increase following the reform.
6constrained. As a rough benchmark, suppose that half of the ﬁrms (weighted by their
e x - p o s tc a p i t a ls t o c k )i nC h i l ea r ec r e d i tc o n s t rained and are investing all their internal
funds. The share of proﬁts (before taxes) to value added can be approximated by the
capital share of national income net of debt payments and depreciation, which we take to
be 20 percent for Chile.7 If the tax on retained proﬁts falls from 50% to 10%,a sh a p p e n e d
in Chile, then the cash ﬂow available to a ﬁrm increases from 10 percent to 18 percent
of value-added. If only credit-constrained ﬁrms invest the additional cash ﬂow, then a
lower bound on the eﬀect of this tax policy change is a 4 percentage point increase in the
investment share of GDP (8×1/2), which is slightly less than half of the increase in the
investment share of GDP in Chile since the mid 19800s.
In sum, for ﬁrms that face liquidity constraints, taxes on retained earnings remove
cash from inside credit-constrained ﬁrms where it is more valuable.
3 The 1984-1986 tax reform
The Chilean tax system prior to 1984 was based upon the principle that households and
ﬁrms should be treated similarly in the tax code. This principle was implemented by
setting the tax rate applied to retained proﬁts of ﬁrms equal to that applied to dividends
or distributed earnings. That is, the personal and corporate tax codes were structured so
that whether proﬁts were paid to the owner or to the ﬁrm was irrelevant for tax revenue
collected.
More speciﬁcally, in the period prior to 1984, the tax treatment of capital income in
Chile can be summarized as follows: 1) proﬁts were taxed at a 10 percent rate; 2) retained
proﬁts (net of the corporate proﬁts tax) were taxed at either the personal income tax rate
of the owners (from 0 to 58 percent) for limited-liability corporations (Sociedad Limitadas)
or a 40 percent rate for publicly traded companies (Sociedad Anonimas); 3) dividends (net
7From 1985 to 1998, the average capital share was 51 percent and the average capital income net of
depreciation was 41.2 percent of GDP (Banco Central de Chile, 1999, Anuario de Cuentas Nacionales,
1999, Table 1.57). Given that this number is larger than the capital share for a typical country and that
interest payments typically account for a third of capital share, 20 percent is a conservative estimate of
the quantity of interest.
7of the corporate proﬁts tax) were taxed at the personal income tax rate (ranging up to
58 percent);8 4) realized capital gains were taxed as dividends if owned by an individual
or as corporate proﬁts if owned by a ﬁrm.9 These taxes cumulate to a high eﬀective tax
rate on retained proﬁts. Retained proﬁts of publicly traded companies were ﬁrst taxed at
10 percent (the corporate proﬁts tax) and the residual net of the 10 percent tax was then
taxed at 40 percent, for an eﬀective tax rate of 46 percent on retained proﬁts. The tax
treatment of retained proﬁts of limited liability corporations was similar, except that the
residual net of the 10 percent corporate proﬁts tax was taxed at the marginal income rate
of the owner of the ﬁrm. This yields an eﬀective tax rate on retained proﬁts of 0.1+0.9τ (τ
is the marginal income tax rate of the owner of the ﬁrm) for limited liability corporations.
In 1980, the average marginal income tax rate of individuals who paid taxes on dividends
and retained proﬁts was 43 percent, which translates into a typical eﬀective tax rate of
almost 50 percent on retained proﬁts.10
In January 1984, the Chilean government enacted a signiﬁcant tax reform. While the
reform altered both the personal and corporate tax codes, the largest change was the near-
elimination of the tax on retained proﬁts that had paralleled the tax on dividends. The
eﬀective tax on retained proﬁts was lowered to 10 percent, eﬀective immediately for limited
liability corporations but phased in over three years for publicly traded companies.11
The tax reform did not alter the tax on corporate proﬁts (10 percent) and left the tax
treatment of capital gains largely unchanged.12 With respect to dividend taxation, the
8This is the tax rate on dividends of limited liability ﬁrms, but the dividends tax for shareholders of
publicly traded companies (Sociedades Anonimas) is slightly more complicated. There were two taxes on
dividends of publicly traded companies. First, dividends were taxed at 40 percent. Second, dividends
net of the 40 percent tax was taxed at the personal income tax rate minus 0.4. The tax rate on dividends
(net of the corporate proﬁts tax) is therefore 0.6*τ +0 .16,w h e r eτ is the personal income tax rate. If
the personal income tax rate is 40 percent, the dividends tax rate is equal to the personal income tax
rate (and equal to the dividend tax rate for limited liability corporations).
9Capital gains on assets held for less than a year were not taxed prior to 1984.
10Calculated from Servicio de Impuestos Internos (1980), pg. 44.
11The retained proﬁts tax rate for publicly-traded companies was lowered to 30 percent in 1984, 15
percent in 1985, and 0 thereafter.
12The 1984 tax reform removed the tax exemption on capital gains held for less than a year, but
otherwise did not change the tax treatment of capital gains.
8tax reform widened personal income tax brackets and lowered marginal income tax rates
slightly. Table 1 describes the personal income tax rates before and after the tax reform.
In addition to the cut in income tax rates, the tax reform also provided a credit for
corporate taxes paid that reduced the basis for the payment of the dividend tax. Table 2
summarizes the eﬀective tax rate on dividends and retained proﬁts before and after the
tax reform.
We note two additional important features of the tax system. First, ﬁrms pay esti-
mated taxes on retained earnings monthly. Thus the change in the tax rate on retained
proﬁts has an immediate impact on the cash ﬂow of corporations. Second, the corporate
tax code was stable from 1986 to 1988, but the tax on retained proﬁts was eliminated
entirely for the tax year 1989.F o l l o w i n g1989, the retained proﬁts tax was increased to
15 percent for the remainder of the 19900s. We focus our analysis of ﬁrms on the period
1980 − 1990.
It is worth asking how the cut in income tax rates is likely to have impacted the
Chilean economy. Cuts in personal tax rates have two main eﬀects on incentives. First,
to the extent that the cuts in marginal tax rates on labor income are perceived as highly
persistent (as they turned out to be in Chile), then changes in tax rates provide no
incentive to substitute labor intertemporally. But persistent tax cuts cause wealth eﬀects
that reduce labor supply and substitution eﬀects from leisure to consumption that increase
labor supply. Based on observed wage levels and hours of work across countries and over
time, if either eﬀect dominates, it is the wealth eﬀect, so that if anything the Chilean
reform should have reduces labor supply. This is hardly an alternative explanation for
the observed boom in saving.13
Second, a reduction in the taxation of dividend income increases the incentive to save
and accumulate capital. Might this aspect of the Chilean reform then have caused the
o b s e r v e de c o n o m i cb o o m ?I ti su n l i k e l yt oh a v ep l a y e dal a r g er o l es i n c e ,a sn o t e di nt h e
Introduction, Chile experienced an investment boom at the time of the reform while saving
13The one caveat to this argument is that lower tax rates on labor income also increase the incentive to
accumulate human capital. It is at least possible that the investment boom occurred to take advantage
of the higher expected future human capital levels.
9rose only slowly following the tax reform. Chile borrowed signiﬁcantly from abroad until
1988 when saving roughly equalled investment. Given the weak observed link between
capital income taxation and economic growth across countries and the small changes that
Chile actually implemented at this time, the changes in personal tax rates are unlikely to
have signiﬁcant contributed to the Chilean economic boom.
4 Aggregate evidence
The behavior of national saving and investment suggest that the reduction in the taxation
of retained proﬁts caused at least part of the rapid growth in Chile. Both saving and
investment rose following the reform, from an average rate of 15 percent from 1960 to
1983, to an average rate of 25 percent in the ﬁr s th a l fo ft h e19900s.
Figure 3a shows that there was a striking change not only in the level but also in
the composition of saving at the time of the tax reform. Business saving increased after
the tax reform, while private saving and public saving remained largely unchanged. Our
theory predicts that saving should rise as ﬁrms respond to the reduction in the tax on
retained proﬁts by retaining more proﬁts, and importantly that households should not
decrease active saving to oﬀset this change.14 With respect to investment, the timing of
the investment boom also supports our theory. Investment increased by 4.5 percent of
GDP in the ﬁrst year of the reform and increases by over 10 percent of GDP over ﬁve
years, reaching 25 percent of GDP in 1989. The tax reform occurred at the beginning of
the investment boom while other reforms such as trade liberalization and the privatization
of the public pension system signiﬁcantly predate the boom.
It should be noted that Chile did experience an investment boom from 1976 to 1981
ﬁnanced by large current account deﬁcits. But this lending boom and following collapse
are common to many countries in Latin America over this time period.15 As shown in
14This is consistent with cash constrained ﬁrms being owned by liquidity constrained households. If
liquidity constraints and cash constraints were not important, a reduction in the retained proﬁts tax rate
might merely result in a shift in the composition of savings from household to corporate savings, with no
eﬀect on aggregate savings.
15The consensus view of these booms are that they were unsustainable lending booms driven by some
10Figure 3b, only the later investment boom is particular to Chile, since the rest of Latin
America stagnated during the 19800s following the debt crisis.16
What other aggregate evidence can we bring to bear? We ﬁrst examine the change in
the debt to asset ratio for ﬁrms during this period. In terms of theory, an unconstrained
ﬁrm should increase its retention of proﬁts relative to payment of dividends in response to
the change in incentives associated with the reduction in the tax on retained earnings.17 A
constrained ﬁrm should increase its after-tax retained earnings and increase its investment.
In terms of data, the national data cover only publicly traded companies, and publicly
traded companies by deﬁnition have some access to capital. Thus, the national data on
debt ratios reﬂects the behavior of more unconstrained ﬁrms than the national average.
As Figure 4a shows, following the reforms, publicly traded ﬁrms reduced their debt but
only after a signiﬁcant lag.18
Figure 4b shows the impact of the tax reform and investment boom on real tax revenues
collected on capital income, both from the personal income tax and the corporate proﬁts
tax.19 The tax revenues from the category that includes retained proﬁts declines from
250 million 1996 pesos in 1984 to less than 100 million 1996 pesos in 1987.A tt h es a m e
time, the revenues collected from the corporate income tax ( the ten percent tax on all
ﬁrm proﬁts) rises starting in 1984 as ﬁrms invest and grow. From 1989 on, excepting
the year 1990 when the retained proﬁts tax was set to zero for a year, the increase in
taxes collected through the general proﬁts tax has more than replaced the lost revenues
on retained proﬁts. Figure 4b suggests that Chile was able to reduce the tax on retained
combination of poorly-regulated ﬁnancial liberalization and a surge in capital inﬂows driven by external
factors. See, for example, Diaz-Alejandro (1984).
16Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, and Venezuela are “the rest of Latin America.”
17There is also a slight reduction in the tax rate on dividends. In a frictionless world, the investment
decision of an extant ﬁrm that pays dividends is undistorted by dividend taxation (Bradford (1981)).
18Note that, as in the United States, despite the favorable tax treatment of retained versus distributed
proﬁts, ﬁrms maintain fairly high levels of debt. Bustos, Engel, and Galetovic (1998) show that from
1985 to 1995, publicly-traded ﬁrms in Chile still carried so much debt such that on average their proﬁts
net of interest payments (and depreciation allowances) was eﬀectively zero (or slightly negative).
19Figure 3b displays taxes collected during a year rather than the taxes collected on activity during a
year.
11earnings and increase tax revenues.
Having presented the basic aggregate facts, we next describe the data on ﬁrms and
plants that we use to construct industry-level data and to categorize plants by constrained
status and test whether constrained plants indeed invested more following the reform.
5 The Chilean Manufacturing Census
The data for our analysis of industry and ﬁrm investment behavior are drawn from the
Chilean Manufacturing Census (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual) conducted annually
by the Chilean government statistical oﬃce (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica). The
survey covers all manufacturing plants in Chile with more than ten employees and has
been run annually since 1979. In addition to working with the raw data ﬁles, we also
use some data from an extract from this survey compiled by the World Bank under the
direction of James Tybout. Finally, the Chilean statistical agency also provided us with
a ﬁle containing information on which plants were owned by the same ﬁrm. Thus, while
we analyze plants, we are able to use the ﬁnancial situation and behavior of ﬁrms to
categorize plants as likely or unlikely to be credit constrained.
The advantages of the Chilean Manufacturing Census (CMC)f o ro u rp u r p o s e sa r ei t s
near universal coverage, annual frequency, and the wealth of information contained about
each plant. We combine the information available in the annual surveys from 1979 to
1990 with the World Bank extract which covers only 1979 to 1986. The survey contains
information on a wide variety of plant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ss u c ha si n d u s t r y( 4 digit ISIC),
factor inputs, energy use, days of production, sales, and so forth. Of particular interest,
plants report investment, employment and production on an annual basis. The book
value of ﬁxed assets is collected in 1980, 1981.T h e CMC data for year t are collected
in surveys conducted in the beginning of year t +1 . The data contain the value of ﬂow
variables over the entire year t a n dt h ev a l u eo fs t o c kv a r i a b l e sa so ft h ee n do fp e r i o dt.
The CMC contains information on ﬁve types of investment: purchases of new capital,
purchases of used capital, production of capital for own use, improvements in own capital
by third parties, and sales of capital. Our measure of investment, to which our capital
12measure corresponds, is the sum of all ﬁve types of investment in machinery and equipment
and vehicles. That is, we exclude investment in land and buildings. Investment can be
negative due to sales of capital and we treat negative reported investment as legitimate.
There are a large number of plants that report zero investment from purchases, production,
improvements, and sales for all varieties of capital goods. Our primary dataset sets
investment to missing only when the World Bank extract considers it missing. This
treats the vast majority of zero investment reports as legitimate zeros and treats all such
reports after 1986, the last year of the World Bank extract, as legitimate. To check
that this assumption is not driving our results, we create an alternative dataset that
sets investment (and thus subsequent capital stocks) to missing if there is zero reported
investment in all categories and types for two consecutive years. Our baseline results thus
use data consistent with those used in previous research, while our alternative dataset
checks the robustness of our main results along this dimension. In general our baseline
results are robust, and we note any places where our results diﬀer.
Our deﬁnition of capital corresponds to our deﬁnition of investment, and includes
machinery, equipment and vehicles, and excludes buildings. We take our main measures
of capital stock from the World Bank extract, which constructs the book value of capital
stock in 1980 and 1981 using an inﬂation adjustment and a depreciation adjustment. To
check that our results do not depend on these adjustments, we also construct a separate
data extract based on the reported book value of capital as reported in the raw survey data.
As with the alternative treatment of investment, our ﬁndings are generally robust to this
alternative, and we note results for which inference depends on our baseline assumption.
The capital stock for a plant for years besides 1980 and 1981 is calculated by iterating
forward using investment and the capital accumulation equation
Kj,t =( 1− δj)Kj,t−1 + Ij,t (1)
where j indexes either machinery and equipment or vehicles and the timing follows from
t h ef a c tt h a ti n v e s t m e n td u r i n gy e a rt adds to the capital reported for end of year t − 1
to capital stock at the end of year t. We use the depreciation rates: 10% for machinery
and equipment, and 20% for vehicles. These are the same rates used in the World Bank
extract. In this procedure, we keep capital stocks positive, and omit depreciation for
13plants that are missing from the survey for a year, and drop plants missing for more than
one year.
We use the machinery price index to deﬂate both investment and capital stock. We
discard plants that die before the experiment that we seek to study, that is any plant
that does not exist after 1983. We drop all plants owned or run by the by government.
We consider investment to capital ratios greater than three or less than minus one to
be mis-coded or mis-reported and so treat them as missing observations. Finally, there
is signiﬁcant attrition of plants. One quarter of plants attrit between 1984 and 1990 in
our baseline sample. Details are contained in appendix B, which also provides a further
description of the data construction.
6 Evidence from Chilean industries
This section presents our main results. We test whether, at the time of the tax reform,
investment increases were concentrated in industries for which external ﬁn a n c ei si m p o r -
tant. Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct measures of the reliance of an industry on
external ﬁnance by examining the use of external ﬁnance by US companies. They show
that in countries with poorly developed ﬁnancial markets, industries that are more reliant
on external ﬁnance grow more slowly relative to the typical growth for that industry and
for that country in aggregate. We take a similar tack to identifying the impact of the cut
in the tax on retained proﬁts. If capital markets in Chile were poorly developed in the
19800s and if the 1984 tax cut disproportionately beneﬁtted plants that are credit con-
strained, then, in industries that are particularly reliant on external ﬁnance, investment
rates should rise disproportionately relative to the typical rate for that industry and for
Chile in that year.
We thus measure the extent to which industries that are more dependent on external
ﬁnance have larger increases in investment rates after the reform, relative to their typical
investment rates, the average investment rate in that year, and controlling for the fact that
if the industry is also capital intensive, it may increase its investment more in response
14to the tax reform. That is, we estimate the following equation
In,t
Kn,t
= αn + γt + EnDtβE + FnDtβD + εi,t (2)
where In,t andKn,t are the total investment and capital stock respectively for industry n
in year t, αn measures the average investment to capital ratio for industry n, γt measures
the average investment to capital ratio in year t, En is dependence on external ﬁnance for
industry n as measured by Rajan and Zingales, Dt is a row-vector of indicator variables
for years after the tax reform begins, βE is the coeﬃcient vector of interest and measures
the amount by which
In,t
Kn,t is higher for industries that are highly dependent on external
ﬁnance in each year after the reform, Fn is a measure of capital intensity — the average of
the 1981 and 1982 log of the ratio of the capital stock in industry n to the to total wages
in industry n, and the vector βD measures the extent to which investment to capital ratios
are larger for industries that are more capital intensive in each year after the reform.
Since we estimate this equation on industry-level data from 1982 to 1990, the ‘typical’
growth rate of an industry is measured by its performance in 1982 and 1983.W e a l s o
measure typical performance by 1982, 1983, 1989 and 1990, by dropping the last two
years of interactions between external dependence and the time indicators and between
capital intensity and the time indicators. The ﬁrst two years have the advantage of being
prior to the reform, but the disadvantage that even after controlling for year eﬀects, the
p a t t e r no fg r o w t ha c r o s si n d u s t r i e sm a yb ea ﬀected by the severity of the 1982 recession.
T h el a s tt w oy e a r sh a v et h ea d v a n t a g eo fb e i n gy e a r so fh e a l t h yg r o w t hi nC h i l e ,b u t
the disadvantage of being post-reform and after a signiﬁcant growth boom, when capital
markets are beginning to develop more generally.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (2) using weighted least squares where
the weights are the number of plants in an industry and making inference allowing for
arbitrary cross-industry correlations in each year.20 Industries are deﬁned by three-digit
20Here we use the degree of external dependence as a continuous variable rather than using it to split the
sample, as we do subsequently with indicators of possibly constrained status in the plant-level analysis.
We choose this functional form to better control for capital intensity. That said, results are substantively
similar if we instead split plants into thirds by the Rajan and Zingales measures and also include indicator
variables for high, medium or low capital intensity.
15ISIC.21 The ﬁrst set of results examines the impact of the reform through 1990, the second
set treat 1989 and 1990 as additional “control” years. The coeﬃcients of interest, βE,t,a r e
negative and insigniﬁcant in 1984, positive in 1985 and positive and signiﬁcant in both
sets of results in 1986,a n d1987. The last column of the Table quantiﬁes the relative
impact of the reform across industries that diﬀer in their degree of ﬁnancial dependence.
An industry one standard deviation above the average level of dependence on external
ﬁnance is predicted to have increased its capital 13 percent according to the ﬁrst set of
results or 6 percent according to the second by the end of 1987 relative to a comparable
industry one standard deviation below the average. Industries that are more dependent
on external ﬁnance grew more rapidly than usual at the time of the reform.22
T h e s er e s u l t ss u p p o r to u rt h e s i st h a tm a n yp l a n t sw e r eh a v i n gd i ﬃculty raising ex-
ternal funds in 1983, that plants in industries most dependent on external ﬁnance were
the most hurt by these constraints, and that in 1985 through 1987, these plants made
the largest increases in their investment. We now turn directly to plant-level evidence
in which we compare the investment behavior of plants that are likely and unlikely to
be cash constrained and control for the typical industry investment levels to see if this
dimension of the data also supports our theory.
7 Evidence from Chilean plants
This section presents comparisons of the investment behavior of plants that are likely and
unlikely to be having trouble raising external funds for productive investment. We mea-
sure the likelihood of being constrained based on the correlation of proﬁts and investment
before the reform, the amount of short-term capital held by the ﬁrm before the reform,
21The exceptions are food processing and manufacture of fabricated metal, where large numbers of
plants allow ﬁner detail, and six industries with few plants that are grouped into three categories. Com-
plete details are in Appendix B.
22Results are similar across samples, similar if one omits the control for capital intensity, and similar if
one compares the three groups: highly dependent, medium dependence and little dependence on external
ﬁnance. More capital intensive industries tend to have no consistent pattern of investment rates in 1984
or 1985, statistically insigniﬁcant higher investment rates in 1986, and lower investment rates in 1987
and 1988.
16whether a ﬁrm pays rent, and the size of the ﬁrm. When ﬁrms are split by investment-
proﬁtc o r r e l a t i o n ,w eﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the reform as predicted by our theory.
There is also some evidence from the sample split by short-term assets. But there is no
detectable post-reform investment boom of plants owned by small ﬁr m sr e l a t i v et ot h o s e
owned by large ﬁr m so ro fp l a n t so w n e db yﬁrms that pay rent relative to those owned
by ﬁrms that do not.
Our key dependent variable is investment during year t divided by capital at the start










Table 4 provides a set of statistics on the number of plants, and the mean, standard
deviation, and median of investment to capital ratios by year.
To characterize plants as likely or unlikely to have restricted access to capital, we
merge plants owned by the same ﬁrm together into observations on ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm, and
its associated plants, are categorized into more and less likely to be liquidity constrained
on the basis of observed ﬁrm characteristics before 1984. Most plants are themselves
ﬁrms; approximately 350 plants are associated with multi-plant ﬁrms during the years of
the reform.
We ﬁrst measure of the likelihood of a plant being credit constrained by the correlation
of cash ﬂow and investment for the entire ﬁrm during the period before the reforms.23 The
argument for this measure is standard. Plants that are credit constrained rely more heavily
on internal funds to ﬁnance operations and so are unable to maintain investment when
cash ﬂow drops signiﬁcantly. Thus, the size of the correlation of cash ﬂow and investment
provides a good measure of the degree to which a plant relies on internal funds to ﬁnance
23Our identiﬁcation strategy is the reverse of that of Calomiris and Hubbard (1995). Calomiris and
Hubbard (1995) identify ﬁrms as credit constrained or not based on their response to a 1937 surtax
imposed on retained earnings. Firms that retain proﬁts despite between 7 and 27 percent additional
taxes on such retained proﬁts are called credit constrained. Constrained plants are found to display a
higher correlation between investment and cash ﬂow than ﬁrms that do not retain proﬁts in the face of
this tax. In contrast, we identify credit constraints by sensitivity to cash ﬂow prior to the tax change,
and then examine whether constrained plants display a greater response to the tax change.
17investment. Our exact measure is the correlation between the ratio of net proﬁts to capital
and the ratio of gross investment to capital over the period 1980 to 1982, where we use
the 1980 capital stock in place of the unavailable 1979 stock. While we choose this period
due to our limited sample, we suspect that this is a good time period for observing which
plants are credit constrained since 1982 was a large, temporary downturn. Plants able to
maintain some investment or avoid selling oﬀ capital in this deep recession are the most
likely to have had owners with deep pockets, access to borrowing, or signiﬁcant internal
funds.
We divide our sample of plants into thirds based on our measure of the correlation
of proﬁts and investment. We expect the group with the highest correlations to be the
most likely to be credit constrained and to beneﬁt the most from the reduction in the
tax on retained proﬁts. We call these plants “constrained,” the middle third “possibly
constrained” and the third of plants with the lowest correlation “unconstrained,” however
these terms do not imply that we believe this split to be perfect. Given this crude measure
there are surely plants that are constrained in the unconstrained sample and vice versa.
This should lead any estimates of the impact of the tax reform to be biased towards zero.
Following these results we present evidence from several alternative or complementary
divisions of plants.







= αi + γt + CiDtβC+PC iDtβPC + εi,t (3)
where αi is a plant-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, γt is a year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, Ci is an indicator
of whether a plant is deemed constrained, PC i is an indicator variable for whether a
plant is possibly constrained, Dt is a row-vector of indicator variables for years after the
tax reform begins, and εi,t captures other factors that impact plant’s investment choices
as well as measurement error in K and I. The column-vectors βC and βPC measure
the diﬀerential investment activity of plants during and after the tax reform relative to
their previous investment rates and relative to the contemporaneous investment choices of
plants deemed unlikely to be constrained. We use all available data on plants from 1982
to 1990 and, as before, vary whether 1989 and 1990 are used as control years by varying
whether indicator variables for 1989 and 1990 are included in the the vector Dt.
18Table 5 presents the estimates from equation (3) in the ﬁrst and second columns of
results. Plants with high correlation of investment and proﬁts through the boom-bust
period of 1980 − 1982 show rapid and large increases in investment rates following the
tax cuts. Constrained plants on average raise their investment rates by three to four
percentage points during the three years of the reform. These estimates control for the
average investment rate of a given plant and for the average investment rate in each
year. We ﬁnd similar results if we instead use our alternative series for capital and/or
investment. The eﬀect of the reform seems to be persistent. There is little evidence
that investment rates slow even several years following the reform, although slightly more
evidence for our alternative capital and investment series. Turning to the plants with
medium correlations of proﬁts and investment, those that we deem possibly constrained,
we also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant although smaller investment boom among these plants, again
after controlling for both time and plant eﬀects.
Our plant-level results so far rely on the assumption that the diﬀerences in the corre-
lation of proﬁts and investment across plants are driven by diﬀerences in access to capital
rather than diﬀerences in technologies and product-speciﬁc demands. This assumption
might fail if our results are largely comparing plants in diﬀerent industries. That is, one
might be concerned there are some industries that use technologies that happen to pro-
duce a high correlation between proﬁts and investment and also happened to boom in
the post-1983 period. We ﬁrst address this alternative by controlling for the investment
rate of each plant’s industry in each year that we study. We then turn to alternative
identiﬁcation strategies.
We ﬁrst compare the investment behavior of across diﬀerentially-constrained ﬁrms
relative to the average investment in that industry in that year. That is, we drop the
ﬁrm and time eﬀects in equation (3), and instead include a set of 33 three-digit industry
level dummies interacted with a complete set of time dummy variables. Denoting an







= αjt + γCCi + γLCLCi + CiDtβC+LCiDtβLC + εi,t. (4)
The coeﬃcients γC and γLC capture the average investment rates of constrained and
possibly constrained plants and the coeﬃcient vectors βC and βLC measure the higher
19investment to capital rates for constrained and possibly constrained plants in each year
relative to the average in that industry in that year. The last two columns of results in
Table 5 show that our conclusions are robust to this alternative speciﬁcation. The relative
investment rates of constrained and possibly-constrained plants rise signiﬁcantly during
the reform. It is also interesting to note that the coeﬃcients on the indicator variables
for constrained and possibly constrained ﬁrms are both negative. This indicates that
constrained ﬁrms invest at lower rates than unconstrained ﬁrms, as one might expect.
It is still the case however that we treat a ﬁrm as constrained if its correlation is
in the top third for all ﬁrms rather than relative to the typical correlation in its own
industry. Thus we next divide plants by investment-proﬁts correlation relative to the
average rate in their industry. A plant is deemed constrained if, among the plants in its
f o u rd i g i ti n d u s t r y ,i ti sa m o n gt h et o pt h i r di nn e tp r o ﬁts-investment correlation prior
to the reform. The results of this exercise are substantively identical to the results in
Table 5, and are not reported. Plants we deem likely to be constrained experience larger
investment booms. The remainder of the results all classify the constrained status of
plants relative to the average values in their industry.
Having established that plants with higher correlations of proﬁts and investment ben-
eﬁt more from the reform, we now investigate alternative assumptions for identifying
constrained and unconstrained plants. We consider three other measures of the degree to
which a plant is short on internal funds: the ratio of short-term reserves to capital, the
r a t i oo fr e n t a lp a y m e n t st oc a p i t a l ,a n dt h es i z eo ft h eﬁrm. All of the splits are based
on numbers in 1980 and 1981, when book values are reported and well prior to the tax
experiment we are considering. On balance, the results of these alternative splits do not
clearly support or refute our main hypothesis.
Table 6 shows the relative investment to capital ratios of plants deemed constrained
by their holdings of short term reserves in 1980 and 1981. Results are quite similar across
the construction of the capital stock series, and robust to whether the 1989 and 1990
years are treated as control years, but diﬀer with respect to the construction of the
investment series. Thus Table 6 presents results from the two diﬀerent constructions of
the investment series. The ﬁrst two sets of results are derived from the baseline series and
20show no signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀect of the reform on plants with low short-term asset
ratios in 1980 and 1981. The second two sets of results show some increase in investment
following the reform, , particularly when we control for the typical growth in each industry
in each year, although the evidence is statistically weak.
One possible explanation for the lack of relative investment boom in this split of the
data is that ﬁrms that are constrained may hold more liquid assets to avoid bankruptcy
than plants that can borrow freely. Thus plants with credit lines maintain low levels of
short-term assets without bankruptcy risk and contaminate this variable as an indicator
of constrained status. There is also the possibility that the high inﬂation rate leads to a
pattern of reserves that is more dependent on monetary factors than real factors. In sum,
we conclude that we ﬁnd some weak support for our hypothesis and no evidence to reject
it, when identifying plants as constrained by comparing their level of short term reserves
to their industry’s average level.
Our second alternative identiﬁcation strategy is to assume that plants that are ﬁnan-
cially constrained and have highly productive investment opportunities may be able to
rent physical capital to partially loosen the ﬁnancial constraint. That is, a ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrm is more likely to rent than own the building in which it operates. In Table
7 we investigate whether plants that report paying rental payments beneﬁtm o r ed u r i n g
the years of the reforms. Since most plants report paying no rent, we simply study those
that do relative to those that do not. We ﬁnd no evidence that plants that pay rent invest
more following the reform. Our ﬁndings are similar whether or not one includes 1989 and
1990 as control years, but diﬀer by capital and investment series, with the results with
only one alternative series lying between the reported pairs of results.
The ﬁnal alternative identiﬁcation strategy is to assume that small plants are more
likely to be constrained. This is standard practice in the literature on credit constrained
plants in the United States — small plants are seen as having signiﬁcantly lower access to
credit markets. In Chile, however, four issues arise. First, previous studies have typically
measured the size of a plant by its capital stock. Thus, capital stocks in 1980 and 1981
could be used to create a split. However, since only book capital is available and there
is signiﬁcant mismeasurement of initial capital stock, this would create a bias towards
21small plants having high investment to capital ratios early in the sample. This bias would
create the incorrect illusion that small plants are growing faster than large plants prior to
the tax reform and potentially that their growth slows relative to large plants as the tax
reform is instituted. We provide a partial solution to this problem by splitting plants by
the average number of employees in 1980 and 1981 rather than by initial capital stock.
The second problem with size as a proxy for ﬁnancial constraints is that many of the
smallest ﬁrms in Chile do not pay taxes at all or pay minimal taxes because the owners
have low incomes. As Table 2 shows, a ﬁrm owned by an individual with a low enough
income to have a zero personal tax rate had the same 10% tax rate on proﬁts before
and after the reform.24 Third, many small manufacturing plants in Chile are family-run
businesses that are perhaps limited in size by economies of scope. The most notable
example of this is that 14 percent of our sample is plants in ISIC 3117, bakeries. In the
United States, “small” ﬁr m si ni n v e s t m e n ts t u d i e sa r eu s u a l l ys m a l lp u b l i cﬁrms, and in
1980 and 1981 in Chile less than one percent of plants are even public. Thus we are really
comparing small plants to small plants. Finally, currently, but even more so in the early
19800s, Chile’s ﬁnancial markets are signiﬁcantly less developed than those in the United
States. Many relatively large plants in Chile do not have access to capital in the same
way that relatively large companies in the United States do. In short, size is much less of
an indicator of access to capital in Chile and more an indicator of industry, for example.
We provide a partial solution to these problems by splitting ﬁrms relative to the average
size in their industry, as discussed previously.
Table 8 presents the results from dividing plants by size. To re-emphasize how diﬀer-
ent this exercise is from previous studies of U.S. data, in the typical industry in Chile,
small plants are deﬁned as averaging 19 employees or less while large plants are deﬁned
as averaging 44 employees or more. As Table 8 shows, there is no evidence that the
investment rates of small plants rise (or fall) disproportionately at the time of the tax
reform.25
24All of our reported results are similar whether or not we exclude ﬁrms that pay no proﬁts tax in the
years prior to and including 1982.
25Results are similar for the alternative deﬁnition of capital and for regressions that include 1989 and
1990 as post-reform years.
22In sum, plants that have a high correlation between cash ﬂow (net proﬁts) and in-
vestment prior to the reform have the largest increases in investment rates post-reform.
This ﬁnding is quite robust. However, alternative measures of which ﬁrms are likely to
be constrained are not supportive of our main thesis.
8 Could other policy reforms be driving our ﬁndings
or the investment boom?
This paper argues that in a country with undeveloped ﬁnancial markets, investment is
constrained by the lack of access to credit. By increasing the internal funds available to
proﬁtable ﬁrms, the 1984 corporate tax reform in Chile played a large role in unleashing
the subsequent rise in Chile’s investment and economic growth. However, an alternative
hypothesis is that most ﬁrms were not credit constrained and that the documented pat-
terns of increases in investment and saving were due to other reforms implemented by
Chile’s military regime over this time period.
This section describes the major reforms that occurred in Chile in the decade leading
up the period of rapid growth: the semi-privatization of the public pension system, the
liberalization and development of ﬁnancial markets, and the opening to trade and capital
ﬂows.26 Each subsection describes the major policy changes in one area and makes the
case that the reforms in question are, based on theory and evidence, unlikely to alter the
inferences drawn so far in this paper.
To be clear, we do not mean to argue that these reforms did not beneﬁt Chilean
economic growth. Rather we suspect that each of these reforms played a role. Our
argument is that these other reforms aﬀected Chile’s steady-state levels of output and
capital per worker. Convergence to these levels, for most countries and states, is a slow
process. But in Chile, the corporate tax reform caused an investment boom and a decade
of rapid convergence.
26See the chapters in Bosworth, Dornbusch, and Laban (1994) and Perry and Leipziger (1999) for a
detailed description of the reforms implemented by the Chilean government.
238.1 Privatization of the public pension system
Prior to 1981, Chile had an unfunded, pay-as-you-go, public pension system much like
t h eU . S .S o c i a lS e c u r i t ys y s t e m . 27 The average payroll tax rate varied signiﬁcantly across
ﬁrms, but was around 30 percent of wages.28 In 1981, the Chilean government cut and
standardized the payroll tax, and created a new system which mandated contributions
to heavily regulated but privately-managed accounts. All new entrants to the labor force
had their payments (20% of wages), less administrative fees and a share for disability and
health insurance (10% of wages), placed into private accounts which they could invest
into one of several regulated mutual funds.29 T h o s ee m p l o y e da tt h et i m eo ft h er e f o r m
had the option to switch into the new system or remain in the old. The new system
was immediately popular: 70 percent of private employment switched in the ﬁrst year.30
Elderly workers tended to remain with the old system and 20 percent of the self-employed
opted to participate.
The new system was fully funded, with the exception that all plans were guaranteed
by the government. To pay the unfunded liabilities of the old system, the government
issued a large amount of new debt, “recognition bonds,” which were bought by households
and slowly paid oﬀ by the government. The ﬁscal costs of payments for these unfunded
liabilities averaged 4.7 percent of GDP in 1981 − 1988.31
How might this reform be responsible for the saving and investment boom? First, note
that as long as households do not change their consumption behavior and government
spending does not change, such a reform has no eﬀect on aggregate national saving.
In such a Ricardian world, measured household saving increases by deﬁnition because
contributions into private accounts are counted as private saving, and this increase is
27For more complete descriptions, see Edwards (1996) and Diamond (1993).
28Exact estimates diﬀer. See Coronado (1997), Gruber (1995), Edwards and Edwards (2000). The
rates were signiﬁcantly higher early in the 1970’s.
29The health insurance share of the tax could be used by the payee to purchased health insurace from
private providers, subject to strict regulation. Among new entrants, the participation of the self-employed
was optional, and this has lead to a signiﬁcant problem of households gaming some of the redistributive
nature of the system by moving in and out of self-employment.
30Coronado (1997).
31Ortuzar (1988), quoted in Edwards (1996), Table 5.
24mirrored by the increased public spending necessary to pay the unfunded liabilities of the
o l ds y s t e m .T h e r ei st h e r e f o r en on e te ﬀect on aggregate saving.
But Ricardian equivalence seems like a poor assumption to apply to Chile in the
early 19800s. Chile had poorly developed ﬁnancial markets and, it seems likely that many
households and small businesses were ﬁnancially constrained. However, the impact of this
reform is exactly the same as in a Ricardian world if households cannot access or borrow
against their private pension accounts. The consumption and investment of constrained
households does not change since the privatization merely replaces a government promise
with a particular account that the government funds by issuing a government promise.
One caveat to this argument is that this reform might alter factor prices, but this does not
occur if rates of return are set by the world capital market. That is, the privatization of the
pension system does not alter saving and investment if the domestic and/or international
capital markets absorb the additional government bonds without altering the domestic
real interest rate.
In practice, the privatization seems to have just re-categorized public pension contri-
butions as private instead of public saving. Figure 5 decomposes household saving into
contributions to the privatized social security system and into non-social security saving.
As i g n i ﬁcant part of the trend increase in household saving (from −3.8 percent of GDP
in 1975 − 1983 to 1.7 percent of GDP in 1984 − 1994) is due to contributions into the
privatized social security accounts. The increase in measured household saving due to
these contributions is mirrored by lower public saving due to the costs of the unfunded
liabilities of the old pension system (as shown in Figure 3a).
Our discussion so far assumes that taxes are nondistortionary. But if private saving
incentives were aﬀected by the reform, then the privatization of social security could be
partially responsible for the saving boom. For example, if payroll taxes were high and
not related to beneﬁts before the reform, then the privatization of social security would
increase the incentives to earn by giving households greater beneﬁts for greater taxes paid.
An increase in labor supply could lead to an investment boom. Evidence on this point is
provided by Gruber (1995), which ﬁnds that the incidence of payroll taxes in Chile fell
fully on wages, with no eﬀect on employment. According to this evidence, payroll taxes
25under the old system did not create signiﬁcant labor market distortions.
Another alternative channel is that the privatized pension funds may have led to a
deepening of ﬁnancial markets and so increased both the incentives for households to save
and the ease of ﬁrm access to ﬁnancial capital. There is some evidence that non-social
security saving increased over the relevant time period (see Figure 5), but the magnitude
of the increase — slightly over 3 percent of GDP from 1975 − 1983 to 1984 − 1994 —i s
small relative to the increase in the aggregate saving rate. Financial market development
is discussed in the next section. Here we reiterate the well-known theoretical result that
even if the reform increased saving, in theory this does not lead to an investment boom in a
small open economy like Chile. Many economists are sceptical of this small open economy
theoretical argument on empirical grounds: saving rates and investment rates are highly
correlated across countries. But if high saving led to high investment in Chile, we would
expect to see Chile exporting at least a small amount of capital. In fact, following the
reform and through much of the 19800s, Chile ran signiﬁcant current account deﬁcits,
importing capital. This fact is strongly suggestive that high saving did not directly cause
high investment, and more importantly that the role of the reform of the public pension
system in the investment boom is minimal.
One important ﬁnal piece of evidence comes from the experiences of the set of countries
that reformed their public pension systems. Samwick (2000) studies seven pension reforms
in Latin America, seven reforms in Africa, two reforms in Asia, and four reforms in
developed economies. Among these countries, there is no evidence that countries that
privatized their social security systems experience an increase in saving rates, with one
exception: Chile.32 It seems unlikely that Chile was the one exception in which the reform
of a public pension caused an large increase in saving and investment.
32Samwick (2000, p.272) concludes, “...n oc o u n t r yo t h e rt h a nC h i l et h a tm o v e dt oas y s t e mo fb a s e d
more on deﬁned contributions during the sample period experienced an increase in the trend saving rates
after reform.”
268.2 Liberalization and development of ﬁnancial markets
Over the last 25 years, there has been a signiﬁc a n ti n c r e a s ei nt h er o l eo fb a n kc r e d i ta n d
publicly-traded equity in Chile’s ﬁnancial markets.33 However, most of this deepening
of ﬁnancial markets occurred in the 19700s and in the 19900s. The increase in ﬁnancial
intermediation of the 19900s seems a direct result of growth rather than the other way
around.
During the ﬁrst few years of the military regime, Chile focused its eﬀorts on liberalizing
the banking sector. From 1974 − 1981, the government lifted interest rate controls, elim-
inated entry barriers to the banking industry, lowered liquidity requirements for banks,
eliminated quantitative controls on credit, and privatized state-owned banks. As shown
in Figure 6a, the result was a large expansion in bank credit, which increased from 10
percent of GDP in the early 19700s to almost 60 percent of GDP by the early 19800s.T h i s
development halted with the advent of the debt crisis and the recession of 1982. After the
banking crisis of 1982, the government took over most of the country’s banks, and, un-
dertook the process of liquidating or recapitalizing and privatizing them, a process which
took many years. Bank credit declined signiﬁcantly in 1982 and continued falling during
the beginning of the investment boom. Bank credit reached its low of 40 percent of GDP
in 1985−86.An e wb a n k i n gl a wi n1986 established limits on the leverage positions of the
banks, increased reserve requirements, and generally increased the supervisory capacity
of the Central Bank over the banking sector. These restrictions kept bank credit roughly
constant at 40 percent of GDP until the start of the 19900s. Thus, bank credit was falling
as the investment boom began and did not rise as a share of output until investment and
saving rates stopped growing.
Turning to the equity market, the stock market played an even more minor role in
Chile’s ﬁnancial system in the 19800s; the market value of publicly traded equity in Chile
was 30 percent of GDP in the 19800s.A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e6b, it was not until the 19900s
that the stock market in Chile increased rapidly. The market value of publicly-traded
stocks in Chile (relative to GDP) roughly tripled from 35 percent of GDP in 1989 to 94
33For additional details, see Gallego and Loayza (2000) and Barandarán and Hernández (1999).
27percent in 1996.34 Since the growth of bank credit was limited in the 19900s, the deepening
of Chile’s capital markets during this decade was disproportionately due to the growth in
the stock market.
Might these changes in Chile’s ﬁnancial structure have driven the saving and invest-
ment boom? They could explain the investment boom if ﬁrms that were previously credit
constrained were able to obtain ﬁnancing for their investments as a result of the deep-
ening of Chile’s ﬁnancial markets. However, the aggregate evidence indicates that the
investment boom was not ﬁnanced by external credit but rather by retained earnings. In
addition, the timing of the lending boom and the stock market boom in Chile does not
support the hypothesis that the investment boom is due to developments in Chile’s ﬁnan-
cial market. The investment boom in Chile took place from 1984 to 1989, but aggregate
bank credit did not increase over this time period. Similarly, Chile’s equity market did not
increase signiﬁcantly until the 19900s, after the investment boom. The evidence suggests
that the investment boom caused the development of Chile’s equity market rather than
the reverse.35
Finally, we check that our main result is not due to the fact that credit-constrained
ﬁrms increased borrowing starting in 1984.R e c a l l t h a t w e ﬁnd that the investment of
likely constrained ﬁrms (measured as ﬁrms with a high correlation of investment and
cash-ﬂow) increased after 1984 relative to the investment of ﬁr m st h a tw e r el i k e l yu n c o n -
strained. If this boom was due to an increased access to credit, then we would expect that
the ratio of interest payments to capital would rise for our “constrained” ﬁrms relative
to our “unconstrained” ﬁrms. To test this hypothesis, we estimate equations (3) and (4)
with interest payments to capital as the dependent variable. We ﬁnd little evidence of this
eﬀect. Table 9 shows the results that match the results presented in Table 5 and there
34This increase is only partially due to an increase in the price of Chilean equity. In fact, the quantity
of Chilean equity, computed by dividing the market val u eo fC h i l e a ns t o c kb yi t sp r i c e ,i n c r e a s e db y7 0
percent from 1990 to 1996 (Eyzaguirre and Lefort (1999), Table 3-1 and Figure 3-2).
35If the investment boom was driven by the development of Chile’s ﬁnancial markets, then a ﬁrm’s
investment should become less sensitive to cash ﬂow, not more sensitive to cash ﬂow. Gallego and Loayza
(2000) ﬁnd some evidence that the investment of publicly traded companies was less sensitive to cash-ﬂow,
but only after the investment boom, that is in the 19900s relative to the 19800s.
28is no evidence that the likely-constrained plants borrowed more when their investment
boomed. Results using the alternative capital stock series or the alternative investment
series also ﬁnd if anything decreases in interest payments for plants deemed likely to be
constrained. However, the alternative capital and investment series together suggest, sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant but economically signiﬁcant increases in interest payments for these
plants. The balance of the evidence is consistent not with a general increase in available
debt instruments and increased access to credit for constrained plants, but rather with
increased funds available from internal sources allowing plants with proﬁtable investment
opportunities to invest substantially more.
8.3 Trade liberalization
Another major reform pursued by Chile in the late 19700s and early 19800s was the lib-
eralization of its trade regime.36 During the 19600s and early 19700s,C h i l e ,l i k em a n y
developing economies, pursued policies of import substitution. By 1973, in addition to
multiple oﬃcial exchange rates and quantitative restrictions on imports, the average tariﬀ
rate exceeded 100 percent. Among the economic reforms pursued by the Pinochet gov-
ernment was international economic openness, so that by 1979,t h ea v e r a g et a r i ﬀ rate had
fallen to 12 percent and many of the regulatory restrictions on importing and exporting
had been removed. From 1976 to 1981, Chilean manufacturing production grew by 25
percent, but at the same time, the balance of trade worsened and the real exchange rate
appreciated signiﬁcantly.
While the liberalization would seem like a boon to growth and possibly a direct cause of
high rates of investment, policy reversed direction during the debt crisis and the deep 1982
recession. By 1984, when the investment boom began, tariﬀs had been raised to an average
of 36 percent, suggesting little role for tariﬀ policy in the investment boom. Indeed, tariﬀs
returned to an average of 15 percent only by 1988. Kasahara (2004) estimates a structural
model of investment on the CMC data and argues that the higher tariﬀ rates from 1983
to 1987 actually signiﬁcantly lowered investment over this period.
To summarize, low tariﬀs lag economic growth and do not lead it. The investment
36See Tybout (1996) and Pavcnik (2002).
29boom began in 1984,w h e nt a r i ﬀs rates peaked. Openness may have been an important
foundation for growth, but seems unlikely to have been the precipitating factor for the
investment boom and growth of the 19800s.
9C o n c l u s i o n
In 1984, Chile had a poorly developed ﬁnancial system, with many banks under public
control or poorly capitalized. Average tariﬀ r a t e sw e r ed o u b l et h er a t e so fﬁve years earlier.
The semi-privatization of the public pension system had moved a large amount of implicit
government debt into an explicit form. Yet, unlike the other Latin American economies,
Chile was experiencing the beginning of a large and persistent rise in investment and
economic growth.
This paper measures the contribution of a corporate tax reform that lowered the tax
on retained proﬁts to this boom. We ﬁnd that the aggregate and industry level evidence
provide clear support for the hypothesis that the reduction in the taxation of retained
earnings allowed ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms to take advantage of proﬁtable investment
activities. Speciﬁcally, we show that the increase in saving associated with the investment
boom was almost entirely an increase in business saving. And more convincingly, control-
ling for a number of factors, we show that investment rates rose the most in industries
that were the most reliant on external ﬁnance.
However, the plant level evidence speaks less clearly on our hypothesis. In support of
our hypothesis, we ﬁnd that plants that exhibited a high correlation of investment and
cash ﬂow prior to the tax reform increased their investment rates the most during and
to some extent following the reform. But other sample splits, included in the paper for
completeness, do not reject the null of no eﬀect of the reform. In particular, there is
no evidence that smaller plants experienced a larger increase in investment after the tax
reform.
Our more general point, supported by the evidence from Chile’s tax reform, is that in
countries with poorly developed ﬁnancial markets, taxation of retained proﬁts may have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on corporate saving and can therefore be particularly harmful for growth.
30By taxing retained proﬁts, the government removes internal funds from some ﬁrms where
the value of these resources exceed the real interest rate. This argument relies on a
country having otherwise favorable macroeconomic policies and conditions. In an economy
with high levels of corruption or taxation, poor property rights, poor infrastructure, and
so forth, the reduction of a tax on retained proﬁts is likely to accomplish little since
investment is low not because of poor ﬁnancial markets but due to few opportunities for
proﬁt. However, in developing economies with strong growth prospects, underdeveloped
ﬁnancial markets may be a signiﬁcant factor retarding economic growth. Corporate saving
is an important source of productive investment, and the Chilean experience shows that
policies that increase the internal funds available to ﬁrms can have disproportionately
large growth eﬀects.
31Appendixes
A A two period model of credit-constraints, taxes, and investment
Consider a two-period model of investment in which ﬁrms choose capital to maximize proﬁts.
Firms face credit constraints and those with low internal funds are constrained from borrowing
to invest at the optimal rate. We demonstrate that taxes on retained earnings are particularly
harmful in this environment.
We set the tax structure in our simple model to mimic the structure of Chile’s taxation of
proﬁts, dividends, and retained earnings, as described in detail in the next section. There are
three taxes levied on capital income: proﬁts tax (τp), retained proﬁts tax (τr), and dividend
income tax (τd). The retained proﬁts and the dividend income tax rate are deﬁned as the tax
rate net of the proﬁts tax; the eﬀective tax rate on retained proﬁts is therefore τp +τr −τp ·τr
and that on dividends is τp + τd − τp · τd.
The economy is small and open so that the interest rate is ﬁxed. We assume that foreign
investors require an after tax return of Rf =1+( 1− τd)r where r is the pre-tax real interest
rate in the economy.
The economy is populated by two-period-lived family ﬁrms. Firms invest at date 1 and
consume at date 2 and maximize the present value of after-tax dividends. There are two types of
ﬁrms: those who at date 1 have few internal funds, Y1 = Y lc
1 (who will be liquidity constrained);
and those who at date 1 have signiﬁcant internal funds, Y1 = Y nlc
1 >Y lc
1 (who will not be
liquidity constrained). These internal funds are proﬁts from previous activity, and are subject
to taxation as such. These resources can be converted into date 2 income either by paying a
dividend, or by using these internal funds to buy capital (II) in the “family” ﬁrm.




Internal funds invested are subject to taxation as retained earnings. Both dividends and invest-
ment are constrained to be weakly positive.
In addition to investing internal funds, the entrepreneur can borrow to ﬁnance investment
in the family ﬁrm, IB, which she repays in the second period at the market interest rate r.T o
capture ﬁnancial constraints in a simple manner, we assume that the maximum amount the ﬁrm
32can borrow is limited to the amount of collateral creditors can seize in the event of a default and
that this amount is the entrepreneurs’ internal funds. Thus, investment ﬁnanced by borrowing,
IB, cannot be greater than after-tax internal funds.
I
B ≤ (1 − τr)(1− τp)Y1 (A.2)
For a ﬁr mi n v e s t i n ga sm u c ha si tc a n ,IB = II =( 1− τr)(1− τp)Y1.
The family ﬁrm produces output net of materials and labor costs in the second period of
Y2 = F(K)=F(IB + II). Firms have access to the same production function regardless of
type. Capital depreciates completely.





















which imply: (A1) that the entrepreneur with internal funds Y lc
1 cannot borrow suﬃcient to
ﬁnance the unconstrained optimal amount of investment; and (A2) that the entrepreneur with
Y nlc
1 can borrow the unconstrained optimal amount without hitting the ﬁnancing constraint.
Firms maximize the present discounted value of after-tax dividends subject to the budget
constraint and collateral constraint.














subject to (A.1)a n d( A.2).
The ﬁrst expression in equation (A.3) is the after-tax value in the second period of dividends
paid in the ﬁrst period. The second term is the after tax value of dividends paid in the second
period. The dividends in the second period are after-tax proﬁts, which are output less debt
repayment less the proﬁts tax and ﬁrms can write oﬀ depreciation and interest payments.
For an entrepreneur with suﬃcient internal funds, the optimal amount of capital is deter-
mined by the ﬁrst order condition for debt IB and the marginal product of capital equals the












f are the optimal choices of Id and If. The marginal product of capital of
an unconstrained ﬁrm is set higher than the world rate of return due to the tax on dividends.
Since interest costs are tax deductible, the choice of capital stock is not aﬀected by proﬁt
taxes or taxes on retained earnings.37 The unconstrained ﬁrm pays its ﬁrst-period proﬁts out
as dividends if the wealth of the entrepreneur is higher saving the dividends outside the ﬁrm
(1 − τd)(1 + (1 − τd)r) > (1 − τp)(1 − τr)(1+r)+τp(1 − τr). This condition is met, for
example, when dividends and proﬁts are taxed similarly and retained proﬁts are taxed.
The investment strategy of the entrepreneurs with few internal funds is to borrow and retain
earnings so as to invest as much as possible. Equation (A.2) binds, I∗
f = I∗
d =( 1 −τp)(1−τr)Y lc
1 ,
















Since the investment of liquidity constrained ﬁrms is constrained to be low, these ﬁrms have an
after-tax marginal product of capital that exceeds the market interest rate.
There are two important implications of equations (A.4) and (A.5). The distortionary ef-
fect of dividend and proﬁts taxes on the capital stock diﬀer for liquidity constrained and non-
constrained ﬁrms. The tax on retained proﬁts does not aﬀect the capital stock of ﬁrms that
do not face binding liquidity constraints. Since they have access to capital markets, these ﬁrms
are able to make up for a reduced level of internal funds (due to the retained proﬁts tax) by
borrowing more from external capital markets. However, dividend taxes distort the choice of
capital stock of unconstrained ﬁrms, by raising the market real interest rate.
I nc o n t r a s t ,at a xo nr e t a i n e dp r o ﬁts does reduce the investment and capital stock for
constrained ﬁrms. Since the capital stock of liquidity constrained ﬁrms is limited by their
available cash ﬂow, taxes on retained proﬁts, by reducing the amount of internal funds available
to the ﬁrm, decrease capital stock of these ﬁrms one for one. Dividend taxes aﬀect the after-
tax second-period income of liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs, but do not aﬀect the capital
37B e c a u s ew eh a v es p e c i ﬁed only the one constraint in capital markets, unconstrained ﬁrms
are able to choose their capital structure as dictated by tax incentives. Thus ,they borrow to
ﬁnance all new investment. In fact, informational, incentive or bankruptcy constraints seem to
cause ﬁrms to limit their debt ﬁnance and in practice proﬁts taxes are likely to distort capital
accumulation. We abstract from these posibilities to keep out model simple and because our
focus is not on the corporate proﬁts tax. We do not mean to maintain that distortions from this
source are not important.
34stock because liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs are already investing their entire ﬁrst period
endowment income in their ﬁrms’ capital stock.
We note three points about robustness. First, we model the heterogeneity across entre-
preneurs as due to diﬀerences in internal funds. But the same implications follow if instead
entrepreneurs have similar limited levels of internal funds and diﬀer by the productivity of
their projects. Then the entrepreneurs who are constrained are those who desire to invest the
most — those with the most productive investment opportunities. Second, we have not been
explicit about product markets. It is necessary that the size of unconstrained ﬁrms be limited
by economies of scope (so there is diminishing returns in F(.)) or by demand, such as through
monopolistic competition. Finally, in a mu l t i - p e r i o dm o d e l ,at a xo nr e t a i n e dp r o ﬁts reduces
optimal investment for an unconstrained ﬁrm since the ﬁrm can postpone the tax burden of
dividends by postponing paying out proﬁts. However, the impact remains signiﬁcantly less
than on the investment behavior of a constrained ﬁrm because it aﬀects the marginal return to
investment from the optimal level rather than a tightening of a binding constraint.
In sum, for ﬁrms that face liquidity constraints, taxes on retained earnings remove cash from
inside credit-constrained ﬁrms where it is more valuable. In contrast, dividend taxes only distort
the investment decisions of ﬁrms at their unconstrained optimal capital stocks.
B Additional details on the Chilean manufacturing census
The CMC survey questionnaires do not directly ask for asset information, but according to the
instructions of the survey, plants are supposed to provide a copy of their balance sheets (that
they are required to keep for tax purposes). These sheets are the source of the asset information,
including the book value of capital, contained in the Survey in 1980 and 1981.B o o kv a l u ei s
also asked annually since 1992. There is a “book value of assets” measure reported in 1986 and
1987.T h e1986 and 1987 numbers are implausibly small (i.e. less than 5 percent of investment)
and we do not use them.
We exclude buildings from our measure of capital and investment because the book value of
capital in 1980 and 1981 only lists land and buildings together while investment data until 1987
do not include land at all. That is, in 1980 or 1981 we construct capital stock using reports on
book value of ﬁxed assets in machinery and equipment, furniture, and vehicles and then distrib-
35ute the amount reported in “other ﬁxed assets” across the three categories (machinery, vehicles
and real estate) in the proportion that each category is of the sum of the three. From 1992
on, the reported asset types are: land; buildings; machinery and equipment; and vehicles. The
CMC contains information on four main categories of capital investment: buildings; machinery
and equipment; vehicles; and, after 1986, land.38
In the World Bank extract, the reported book value of capital stock has a monetary adjust-
ment factor (in addition to being deﬂated to be made real) and is also adjusted to account for
some depreciation. Since the documentation is unclear as to how these adjustments are derived,
we construct two separate data extracts: one that is based on the reported book value of capital
as reported in the raw survey data for 1980 (1981 if 1980 is missing or zero); the other that
i sb a s e do nt h e“ n e t , ”“ i n ﬂation adjusted” capital stock as reported in the World Bank extract
for 1980 (1981 if 1980 is missing or zero). “Net” and “inﬂation adjusted” are the terms used
in the Wold Bank documentation.
We use a machinery price index to deﬂate both investment and ﬁxed assets in machinery and
equipment, and vehicles. Capital stock in “other assets” is distributed across categories in the
construction of K by category and and the deﬂation is done after this distribution. We deﬂate
the reported book values of capital stock by the average deﬂator for year t and year t +1since
the reported book values refer to end of year values and the deﬂators provide a price index for
the entire year. Flow variables such as investment are simply deﬂated by year t price deﬂators.
In cumulating past capital stocks and investment to construct capital stocks, the data are
cleaned in three ways. First, in some rare cases, we infer that the capital stock becomes negative,
and we reset these stocks to zero. Since capital is a denominator such an observation is not used
in analysis. Since we drop extreme outliers some cases close in time to this observation with
unreasonably low capital stocks are also not used. Second, when a plant disappears from the
sample for only one year, we assume that it was merely missed in the survey for a year and
carry its capital stock forward over the missing year without adjustment. That is we assume
that investment roughly equalled depreciation during the omitted year. Finally, plants absent
38In 1987 and 1988 investment in land is reported under “other” investment; after 1988,l a n d
is its own investment category. Prior to 1987, investment in land is not included in the survey;
notably it is not included in investment in real estate (whereas in this period land is included
in capital stock in real estate).
36for more than one year are considered to have become too small to be in the survey or to have
gone bankrupt, and any future observations on such a plant are dropped.
A nontrivial number of plants, about 20 percent, switch industry codes at some point during
the period over which they are observed. We treat these as legitimate. Firms that are associated
with plants that cover multiple industries are associated with the mode industry. Where ties
occur they are broken somewhat randomly by choosing the smallest industry code. Most ﬁrms
operate plants in related industries, and we veriﬁed that this allocation rule does not drive any
results. Finally, roughly half of plants “attrits” between 1983 and 1990 for the alternative sample
that sets investment to missing following two consecutive years of zero reported investment.
Industries are deﬁned by their three-digit ISIC code, except that a) the food production
industry (311) is treated as four separate three digit industries since it has so many of the ﬁrms
in the sample (groups are 3111 and 3112 (meat and dairy); 3113, 3114, and 3115 (canning
and oils and fats); 3116, 3118 and 3119 (grains, sugar, and cocoa); 3117 (bakeries); b) 312
(other manufactured foods and animal feed)is grouped with 3140 (tobacco); c) industry 381
(fabricated metal except machines) is also treated more ﬁnely — it is simply left at the four digit
level; and ﬁnally d) due to small numbers, industry 3540 (petroleum and coal) is grouped with
353 (petroleum reﬁneries) and 3620 (glass) is grouped with 361 (pottery and china).
C Additional data sources
Figure 1a: Penn-World Tables.
Figures 1b, 3a, and 5: Bennett, Schmitt-Hebbel, and Soto (1999).
Figure 3b: International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Figure 4a: Central Bank of Chile, "Quarterly Economic and Financial Report of Chile,"
various issues.
Figure 4b: Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion de Presupuestos, "Estadisticas de las Finanzas
Publicas, 1988-1997," March 1998 and Ministerio de Hacienda, Direccion de Presupuestos, "Ley
de Presupuestos del Sector Publico," various years.
Figures 6a and 6b: Eyzaguirre and Lefort (1999), Tables 3-1 and 3-6.
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41Tax Bracket Marginal Tax Rates Tax Bracket Marginal Tax Rates
(1983-1985) 1983 1984 1985 (1986) 1986
0-32,140 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 − 32,140 0.00
32,140-80,350 0.08 0.07 0.06 32,140 − 96,420 0.05
80,350-128,560 0.13 0.12 0.11 96,420 − 160,700 0.10
128,560-176,770 0.18 0.17 0.16 160,700 − 224,980 0.15
176,770-224,980 0.28 0.27 0.26 224,980 − 289,260 0.25
224,980-273,190 0.38 0.37 0.36 289,260 − 385,680 0.35
273,190-321,400 0.48 0.47 0.46 385,680 − 482,100 0.45
above 321,400 0.58 0.57 0.56 above 482,100 0.50
Table 1: Personal Income Tax Rates in Chile pre and post Reform
Notes. The tax brackets are indexed for inﬂation. The 1986 tax bracket is quoted in January
1984 pesos p/month
42Sociedad Anonimas Sociedades Limitadas
Retained Proﬁts Distributed Proﬁts Retained Proﬁts Distributed Proﬁts
pre-1984 0.460 0.244 + 0.54τ 0.10 + 0.9τ 0.10 + 0.9τ
1984 0.370 0.118 + 0.63τ 0.10 τ
1985 0.235 0.04375 + 0.765τ 0.10 τ
post 1985 0.100 τ 0.10 τ
Table 2: Tax Rates on Corporate Proﬁts and Dividends in Chile pre and post
Reform
Notes. τ is the marginal personal income tax rate.




Interaction of Dependence on
External Finance and: 1984 -0.024 (0.015) -0.010
1985 0.019 (0.015) 0.008
1986 0.035 (0.014) 0.014
1987 0.046 (0.015) 0.019
1988 -0.032 (0.015) -0.013
Panel B
Interaction of Dependence on
External Finance and: 1984 -0.003 (0.004) -0.001
1985 0.039 (0.004) 0.016
1986 0.055 (0.004) 0.022
1987 0.067 (0.004) 0.027
1988 -0.011 (0.004) -0.004
1989 0.056 (0.004) 0.023
1990 0.037 (0.004) 0.015
Number of Observations: 306
Effect of One Standard 
Deviation Increase in 
External Finance 
Dependency 
Note: Regressions include industry and year effects captial labor ratio interacted with year effects.  
Standard errors are calculated allowing for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and cross-industry 
correlations within each year.  Regressions are run on data from 1982 to 1990 and include only 
plants that survive until at least 1984.  Panel A uses 1982, 1983, 1989, and 1990 as control years; 
Panel B uses only 1982 and 1983.  See text for further details.Panel A: Baseline Sample Panel B: Alternative Initial Capital Stock
Capital stock initialized from World Bank extract Capital stock initialized as the reported book value
Investment missing following the World Bank extract Investment missing following the World Bank extract
Year Number of Mean I/K Standard Median I/K Year Number of Mean I/K Standard Median I/K
Observations Deviation I/K Observations Deviation I/K
1981 3,283 0.115 0.303 0.000 1981 3,286 0.111 0.266 0.000
1982 3,321 0.058 0.209 0.000 1982 3,354 0.056 0.197 0.000
1983 3,209 0.059 0.213 0.000 1983 3,235 0.057 0.199 0.000
1984 3,209 0.071 0.219 0.000 1984 3,233 0.065 0.194 0.000
1985 3,013 0.068 0.212 0.000 1985 3,028 0.065 0.204 0.000
1986 2,767 0.079 0.233 0.000 1986 2,784 0.075 0.223 0.000
1987 2,635 0.103 0.251 0.009 1987 2,653 0.102 0.252 0.009
1988 2,517 0.113 0.266 0.019 1988 2,533 0.116 0.278 0.020
1989 2,433 0.139 0.289 0.029 1989 2,434 0.134 0.275 0.027
1990 2,375 0.112 0.258 0.017 1990 2,378 0.112 0.255 0.017
Panel C: Alternative Investment Series Panel D: Alternative Capital Stock and Investment Series
Capital stock initialized from World Bank extract Capital stock initialized as the reported book value
Investment missing if zero in two consecutive years Investment missing if zero in two consecutive years
Year Number of Mean I/K Standard Median I/K Year Number of Mean I/K Standard Median I/K
Observations Deviation I/K Observations Deviation I/K
1981 1,907 0.2005734 0.3781525 0.0788183 1981 1,907 0.2041381 0.3452066 0.0847551
1982 1,757 0.1066308 0.280374 0.0306863 1982 1,783 0.1036753 0.2554344 0.0305476
1983 1,449 0.103754 0.2584918 0.0302968 1983 1,464 0.0945425 0.2267038 0.0277332
1984 1,309 0.1307663 0.2723599 0.0499551 1984 1,321 0.1177184 0.2378064 0.0465582
1985 1,184 0.1205192 0.2390222 0.0457503 1985 1,186 0.1001863 0.1807689 0.0409718
1986 982 0.142286 0.2620428 0.0643813 1986 986 0.1254738 0.2290787 0.0575351
1987 831 0.1469315 0.2320091 0.0764872 1987 834 0.1308616 0.2008967 0.0660726
1988 791 0.1503537 0.2451368 0.0902295 1988 794 0.1383945 0.2204166 0.0792377
1989 762 0.1831413 0.2607033 0.1085611 1989 763 0.1688204 0.2344262 0.0992237
1990 727 0.1631771 0.2540562 0.0911481 1990 730 0.1535068 0.2518668 0.0807679
Table 4: Number of Plants and Investment Capital Ratios by Year and SampleTable 5: Investment to Capital as a Function of Profit-Investment Correlations and Year
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error Error Error
High correlation indicator: -0.021 (0.006) -0.039 (0.008)
High corr. plants in: 1984 0.049 (0.012) 0.063 (0.013) 0.044 (0.013) 0.063 (0.014)
1985 0.032 (0.012) 0.046 (0.013) 0.031 (0.013) 0.049 (0.014)
1986 0.024 (0.013) 0.038 (0.014) 0.024 (0.013) 0.042 (0.014)
1987 0.008 (0.013) 0.023 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014) 0.026 (0.015)
1988 0.031 (0.013) 0.046 (0.014) 0.033 (0.014) 0.051 (0.015)
1989 0.039 (0.014) 0.045 (0.015)
1990 0.024 (0.014) 0.036 (0.015)
Medium correlation indicator: -0.039 (0.006) -0.058 (0.008)
Medium corr. plants in: 1984 0.024 (0.012) 0.041 (0.013) 0.023 (0.012) 0.042 (0.013)
1985 0.016 (0.012) 0.034 (0.013) 0.017 (0.013) 0.036 (0.013)
1986 0.011 (0.012) 0.029 (0.013) 0.013 (0.013) 0.033 (0.014)
1987 0.023 (0.013) 0.042 (0.014) 0.023 (0.013) 0.042 (0.014)
1988 0.031 (0.013) 0.051 (0.014) 0.034 (0.013) 0.053 (0.014)
1989 0.038 (0.014) 0.038 (0.014)
1990 0.046 (0.014) 0.051 (0.015)
Number of Observations: 24,590
Industry x Year Effects
24,590 24,590 24,590
Note: Correlation categorizations are based on the three observations of investment to capital ratios and net profit to capital ratios in 
1980, 1981, and 1982.  Regressions are run on data from 1982 to 1990 and include only plants that survive until at least 1984.  See text 
for further details.
Plant and Year Effects Plant and Year Effects Industry x Year EffectsTable  6:  Investment  to  Capital  as  a  Function  of  Short-Term  Assets  to  Capital  Ratio
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error Error Error
Low assets indicator: -0.019 (0.006) -0.016 (0.010)
Low plants in: 1984 -0.005 (0.011) -0.002 (0.012) -0.001 (0.020) 0.031 (0.022)
1985 0.012 (0.011) 0.013 (0.012) 0.020 (0.021) 0.035 (0.023)
1986 0.008 (0.012) 0.010 (0.013) 0.020 (0.023) 0.035 (0.025)
1987 -0.001 (0.012) 0.010 (0.013) 0.003 (0.025) 0.010 (0.027)
1988 0.007 (0.012) 0.017 (0.013) 0.005 (0.026) 0.011 (0.028)
Medium assets indicator: -0.041 (0.006) -0.049 (0.009)
Medium plants in: 1984 -0.006 (0.011) -0.004 (0.012) -0.016 (0.019) -0.003 (0.020)
1985 0.013 (0.012) 0.016 (0.012) 0.006 (0.020) 0.019 (0.021)
1986 0.007 (0.012) 0.006 (0.013) 0.003 (0.021) -0.002 (0.022)
1987 0.021 (0.012) 0.022 (0.013) 0.027 (0.022) 0.020 (0.024)
1988 0.003 (0.012) 0.003 (0.013) -0.008 (0.023) -0.022 (0.025)
Number of Observations:
Alternative Investment Series Baseline Series
Plant and Year Effects Industry x Year Effects Plant and Year Effects Industry x Year Effects
24,666 24,666 9,404
Note: All regressions include year and plant indicator variables. Categorizations are based on the ratio of short-term assets to capital
in 1980 and 1981 relative to the industry average. Regressions are run on data from 1982 to 1990 and include only plants that survive
until at least 1984. See text for further details.
9,404Table  7:  Investment  to  Capital  as  a  Function  of  Whether  a  Firm  Pays  Rent
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error Error Error
Rent Paying
plant indicator: 0.024 (0.005) 0.027 (0.008)
Rent Paying
plant in: 1984 -0.007 (0.010) -0.009 (0.010) 0.010 (0.014) -0.003 (0.018)
1985 -0.018 (0.010) -0.020 (0.011) 0.016 (0.015) 0.006 (0.019)
1986 -0.003 (0.010) -0.005 (0.011) 0.014 (0.016) 0.008 (0.020)
1987 -0.015 (0.011) -0.023 (0.011) -0.003 (0.018) -0.019 (0.022)
1988 -0.017 (0.011) -0.026 (0.012) 0.011 (0.018) 0.009 (0.023)
Number of Observations:
Industry x Year Effects
9,618
Note: Plants are categorized as rent-payers based on 1980 and 1981 data. Regressions are run on data from 1982 to 1990 and include
only plants that survive until at least 1984. See text for further details.
Baseline Series Alternative Capital and Investment Series
Plant and Year Effects Industry x Year Effects Plant and Year Effects
24,666 24,666 9,618Table 8: Investment to Capital as a Function of Plant Size and Year
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error Error Error
Small plant indicator: -0.021 (0.006) 0.026 (0.010)
Small Plants in: 1984 0.008 (0.011) -0.005 (0.013) 0.038 (0.020) 0.019 (0.021)
1985 -0.004 (0.011) -0.019 (0.013) 0.016 (0.020) 0.008 (0.022)
1986 -0.004 (0.012) -0.015 (0.013) -0.042 (0.022) -0.031 (0.024)
1987 0.038 (0.012) 0.031 (0.014) -0.019 (0.024) -0.003 (0.026)
1988 0.020 (0.012) 0.008 (0.014) -0.006 (0.024) 0.024 (0.026)
Medium plant indicator: -0.009 (0.005) -0.007 (0.009)
Medium Plants in: 1984 0.008 (0.011) 0.005 (0.012) 0.024 (0.019) 0.024 (0.020)
1985 0.006 (0.011) 0.006 (0.012) -0.001 (0.020) 0.008 (0.020)
1986 -0.002 (0.012) -0.003 (0.012) 0.032 (0.021) 0.031 (0.022)
1987 0.008 (0.012) 0.004 (0.012) 0.016 (0.023) 0.014 (0.024)
1988 0.023 (0.012) 0.022 (0.013) 0.033 (0.023) 0.042 (0.024)
Number of Observations:
Industry x Year Effects Plant and Year Effects Industry x Year Effects Plant and Year Effects
Note: Size categorizations are based on the percent difference in firm employment in 1980 and 1981 from the industry average.
Regressions are run on data from 1982 to 1990 and include only plants that survive until at least 1984. See text for further details.
Results using the alternative capital series and including 1989 and 1990 interactions yeild similar results.
Baseline Series Alternative Investment Series
25,479 25,479 9,792 9,792Table 9: Interest Payments to Capital as a Function of Profit-Investment Correlations and Year
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error Error Error
High correlation indicator: 0.131 (0.051) 0.196 (0.068)
High corr. plants in: 1984 -0.052 (0.086) -0.138 (0.093) -0.024 (0.109) -0.090 (0.118)
1985 -0.090 (0.088) -0.180 (0.095) -0.141 (0.111) -0.206 (0.120)
1986 -0.140 (0.090) -0.232 (0.097) -0.183 (0.114) -0.249 (0.123)
1987 -0.194 (0.092) -0.288 (0.099) -0.125 (0.116) -0.190 (0.125)
1988 0.002 (0.093) -0.094 (0.101) 0.035 (0.118) -0.031 (0.126)
1989 -0.206 (0.102) -0.141 (0.128)
1990 -0.222 (0.103) -0.166 (0.129)
Medium correlation indicator: -0.030 (0.050) -0.072 (0.066)
Medium corr. plants in: 1984 -0.003 (0.083) 0.035 (0.089) 0.009 (0.106) 0.051 (0.115)
1985 0.030 (0.085) 0.070 (0.091) 0.006 (0.109) 0.048 (0.117)
1986 -0.020 (0.088) 0.022 (0.094) -0.028 (0.112) 0.014 (0.120)
1987 -0.007 (0.089) 0.036 (0.096) 0.006 (0.115) 0.048 (0.123)
1988 0.048 (0.091) 0.092 (0.098) 0.054 (0.117) 0.096 (0.125)
1989 0.096 (0.099) 0.098 (0.126)
1990 0.116 (0.100) 0.111 (0.127)
Number of Observations: 24,631 24,631 24,631
Plant and Year Effects Plant and Year Effects Industry x Year Effects Industry x Year Effects
24,631
Note: Correlation categorizations are based on the three observations of investment to capital ratios and net profit to capital ratios in 
1980, 1981, and 1982.  Regressions are run on data from 1982 to 1990 and include only plants that survive until at least 1984.  See text 
for further details.45
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Investment to GDP in Latin America








































































































































































































Tax on Dividends, Capital Gains, and Retained Profits





















































































































































































Market Value of Publicly Traded Stocks
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